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Abstract
In this paper I show that discretionary policymaking can be superior to timeless perspective
policymaking and identify model features that make this outcome more likely. Developing
a measure of conditional loss that treats the auxiliary state variables that characterize the
timeless perspective equilibrium appropriately, I use a New Keynesian DSGE model to
show that discretion can dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the Phillips
curve is relatively ￿ at, due, perhaps, to ￿rm-speci￿c capital (or labor) and/or Kimball
(1995) aggregation in combination with nominal price rigidity. These results suggest that
studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to
discretion, paying careful attention to how policy performance is evaluated.
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In this paper I ask whether discretionary monetary policy can dominate policy designed ac-
cording to the timeless perspective and answer in the a¢ rmative. I then examine the factors
that govern this result, employing a microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model to ascertain the role that nominal and real rigidities play in determining
whether discretion is superior. Indeed, I show that discretion is more likely to dominate
timeless perspective policymaking in models where nominal and real rigidities are important.
Two additional contributions of the paper are that it develops a measure of conditional loss
suitable for consistently evaluating timeless perspective and discretionary policies and that it
shows how timeless perspective equilibria can be obtained from the solution to an unmodi￿ed
formulation of the optimal commitment problem. An important conclusion of the paper is
that studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to
discretion.
The timeless perspective approach to policy design was ￿rst outlined in Woodford (1999a),
advanced as a solution to the ￿initial period￿problem that characterizes optimal commitment
policies.1 At that time, Woodford (1999a) argued that the initial period problem could be
overcome if the central bank were to ￿adopt, not the pattern of behavior from now on that
would be optimal to choose, taking expectations as given, but rather the pattern of behavior
to which it would have wished to commit itself to at a date far in the past, contingent upon
the random events that have occurred in the meantime.￿ Simply put, the initial period
problem ceases to be a problem when the initial period has long since passed.2 In subsequent
work, the concepts of timeless perspective policymaking and timeless perspective equilibria
have been re￿ned and made formal.3 Because this approach overcomes the initial period
problem, the literature on monetary policy has embraced it, to the point where such policies
increasingly form the backbone of policy analysis, and one central bank￿ Norges Bank￿
employs the timeless perspective to construct its public interest rate forecasts.
Timeless perspective policies are closely related to optimal commitment policies. In partic-
ular, both policies involve auxiliary state variables whose role is to track the value of commit-
1As explained in Section 2, optimal commitment policies are subject to an ￿initial period￿problem because
such policies involve the central bank exploiting expectations held as of the optimization date while promising
never to do so in the future.
2Notice that for this to be true the timeless perspective equilibrium must be stationary, a condition stronger
than standard transversality conditions. In a linear-quadratic model, the standard transversality condition
requires the economy to grow at a rate no greater than
1 p
￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
3See Woodford (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b), and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006).
1ments over time. One implication of these auxiliary state variables is that timeless perspective
policies involve commitments and are not time-consistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott
(1977). At the same time, timeless perspective policies are not optimal in the sense of Kyd-
land and Prescott (1980), opening the door to the possibility that they may be inferior to
other suboptimal policies, such as discretion. It is important to compare the performance
of timeless perspective policies to discretion because such a comparison helps to identify and
understand situations where timeless perspective policymaking may be inferior to discretion.
More generally, such a comparison allows us to better understand when discretionary policies
perform well and when timeless perspective policies perform less well.
Rather than employ unconditional loss to compare discretion to timeless perspective poli-
cymaking (McCallum and Nelson, 2004; Sauer, 2007), I develop a measure of conditional loss
suitable for the task.4;5 In particular, I show how the auxiliary state variables that enter the
timeless perspective equilibrium can be ￿integrated out￿to produce a measure of loss that
depends upon the state variables that describe the original optimization problem and that are
common to both equilibria. For linear-quadratic models, this integration lowers the perfor-
mance of the timeless perspective policy relative to the optimal commitment policy by terms
that quantify the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the auxiliary states. Of
course, it is far from automatic that these adjustments will permit a timeless perspective to
be dominated by discretion. However, using standard New Keynesian DSGE models, I show
that factors that ￿ atten the New Keynesian Phillips curve, such as nominal price rigidity,
￿rm-speci￿c labor/capital, and Kimball (1995) aggregation, can raise the conditional volatil-
ity (in particular) of the auxiliary state variables to the point where discretion becomes the
superior policy. Indeed, the intuition for this result is reasonably clear. As the Phillips curve
becomes increasingly ￿ at, the central bank must generate greater volatility in real marginal
costs in order to stabilize in￿ ation. To the extent that real marginal costs are correlated
4Indeed, some have interpreted the term ￿timeless perspective￿to mean that timeless perspective policies
should be derived as the solution to an unconditional optimization problem (Blake, 2001, Jensen and McCallum,
2002, Damjanovic, Damjanovic, and Nolan, 2008). Since Woodford￿ s approach to timeless perspective policy
design does not do this, these studies have found that timeless perspective policies are not optimal from the
timeless perspective. The policy associated with the solution to the unconditional optimization problem is
sometimes referred to as the Blake-Jensen-McCallum alternative.
5There are several good reasons why unconditional loss should not be used to compare policies. First, the
loss function common to both the timeless perspective and discretionary optimization problems is (invariably)
conditional. Second, because the timeless perspective policy and the optimal commitment policy share the
same asymptotic equilibrium, using unconditional loss to evaluate performance amounts to comparing discretion
to the optimal commitment policy. Third, by ignoring transition dynamics, the use of unconditional loss can
generate spurious performance reversals (Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims, 2005).
2with the central bank￿ s other policy objectives, this volatility in real marginal costs raises the
volatility of the commitments that characterize the timeless perspective policy, penalizing its
performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the timeless
perspective approach to policy design, applying it to a simple New Keynesian model. Sec-
tion 3 shows how standard control methods for rational expectations models can be used to
construct and analyze the equilibrium of a timeless perspective policy. Section 4 turns to
methods for evaluating timeless perspective policies, showing why the treatment of the auxil-
iary states matters importantly for performance comparisons. Subsequently, Section 4 shows
how the auxiliary state variables can be conditionally integrated out to construct a measure of
conditional loss that is easy to compute and that is suitable for comparing the performance of
discretion and timeless perspective policies. Applying this measure of conditional loss to the
simple New Keynesian model described in Section 2, Section 4 shows that discretion can be
superior to timeless perspective policymaking. Section 5 extends the analysis to a small-scale
DSGE model and shows that factors that ￿ atten the slope of the Phillips curve increase the
likelihood that discretion will be superior to timeless perspective policymaking. Section 6
concludes.
2 Timeless perspective policy design
Commitment policies that are optimal in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1980) are not sta-
tionary. If a commitment mechanism is available, then the optimal policy is to exploit private
sector expectations in the initial period while promising never to do so in the future. Such
policies are not stationary because the initial period, the period in which the optimization just
happens to occur, holds a special signi￿cance. To some, this feature of optimal commitment
policies, although fundamental to their being optimal, is unattractive and undesirable. After
all, when conducting policy today, why should a policymaker implement a policy that, while
optimal from the perspective of some arbitrary date in the past, is suboptimal today?
To overcome this ￿initial-period problem￿and obtain a stationary policy, it is now common
to assume that policymakers approach policy design from a timeless perspective (Woodford,
1999a). Broadly speaking, a timeless perspective policymaker promises not to exploit initial
conditions. Instead, the policymaker ties its hands and commits to behave in the initial period
as it does in all subsequent periods. Put di⁄erently, the timeless perspective policymaker
implements policy as if that policy had been formulated in the distant past, such that any
3advantage from exploiting initial conditions has long since evaporated.
Timeless perspective policies have a certain attraction insomuch as they are both optimal
and time consistent￿ from the timeless perspective. However, timeless perspective policies
are neither optimal nor time consistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977, 1980). As
a consequence, timeless perspective policies face credibility problems, such that it is unclear
whether they can feasibly be implemented, and it is not obvious whether they are necessarily
superior to discretion.
2.1 A simple example
To make timeless perspective policymaking concrete, consider the following simple example.














where ￿t denotes in￿ ation, yt denotes the output gap, ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the subjective discount
factor, and ￿ 2 [0;1) and ￿ 2 [0;1) denote the relative weights on output and interest
rate stabilization relative to in￿ ation stabilization, respectively, and E0 is the mathematical
expectations operator conditional on period 0 information. Under certain circumstances,
equation (1) can be viewed as a second-order accurate approximation to household welfare
(Benigno and Woodford, 2006). For the purposes of this section, however, I will simply take
equation (1) to be primal.
Constraining the central bank￿ s optimization problem are
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + ut; (2)
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿ (it ￿ Et￿t+1) + rn
t ; (3)
ut+1 = ￿uut + ￿ut+1; (4)
rn
t+1 = ￿rrn
t + ￿rt+1 (5)
where ut denotes a markup shock, rn
t denotes a neutral rate shock, and the initial conditions
u0 and rn
0 are known. The innovations ￿ut and ￿rt are assumed to be i:i:d: with zero mean and
￿nite variance. Equation (2) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve associated with Calvo-pricing
(Calvo, 1983). Equation (3) is the standard consumption-Euler equation that, abstracting
from government spending, investment, and trade, is written in terms of the output gap.
Equations (4) and (5) describe the laws of motion for the markup shock and the neutral
4rate shock. The parameters f￿;￿g 2 (0;1) describe the price rigidity and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, respectively, while f￿u;￿rg 2 (￿1;1) summarize the persistence
properties of the two shocks.
In addition to equations (2) through (5), the ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal com-
mitment policy are
￿￿t + ￿￿t+1 = 0; t = 0; (6)
￿￿yt ￿ ￿￿￿t+1 + ￿￿yt+1 = 0; t = 0; (7)
￿￿t + ￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t ￿ ￿￿yt = 0; t > 0; (8)
￿￿yt ￿ ￿￿￿t+1 + ￿￿yt+1 ￿ ￿yt = 0; t > 0; (9)
￿it + ￿￿yt+1 = 0; t ￿ 0; (10)
where ￿￿t+1 and ￿yt+1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with equations (2) and (3),
respectively. The time inconsistency of the optimal commitment policy is re￿ ected in the
di⁄erence￿ s between equations (6) through (7) and equations (8) through (9), which imply a
di⁄erent policy when t = 0 than when t > 0. Notice, however, that these di⁄erences disappear
when ￿￿0 = ￿y0 = 0. As a consequence, the optimal commitment policy can be obtained by
applying standard saddle-point solution methods to equations (2) through (5) and (8) through
(10), with the initial conditions ￿￿0 = ￿y0 = 0 and u0, rn
0, known.
2.2 Timeless perspective policymaking
To obtain the Woodford (1999a) timeless perspective policy for this model the approach is to
proceed as follows. First, to introduce the timeless perspective, assume that equations (8)
and (9) also apply when t = 0, e⁄ectively discarding equations (6) and (7). Then, to obtain
a policy that is implementable, use equation (10) to solve for ￿yt+1 and equation (9) to solve
for ￿￿t+1 and substitute these expressions into equation (8) to eliminate the two Lagrange




(yt ￿ yt￿1) ￿
￿
￿￿￿
[(￿ + ￿￿)(it ￿ it￿1) ￿ (it￿1 ￿ it￿2)] +
￿
￿
it = 0; t ￿ 0: (11)
Provided ￿ > 0, equation (11) can be solved for it, giving rise to what is known as an explicit
targeting rule. The timeless perspective equilibrium is now obtained by solving for the
rational expectations equilibrium of equations (2) through (5) and (11), with u0, i￿1, and i￿2
known. Notice that the timeless perspective policy depends on the change in the output gap,
a point emphasized by Walsh (2003) in his discussion of ￿speed limit￿policies, and on lags
5of the interest rate, a point Woodford (1999b) highlights in his analysis of optimal interest
rate inertia. Further, as Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) stress, because the shocks are not
directly present, the timeless perspective targeting rule, as represented by equation (11), is
robust to misspeci￿cation of the shock processes.
3 A general approach
Researchers are often less interested in the timeless perspective targeting rule itself than they
are in the timeless perspective equilibrium. For example, if they are interested in impulse
responses, assessing the importance of particular shocks for business cycle volatility, or under-
standing the economic e⁄ects of particular nominal/real rigidities, then the object of interest
is the timeless perspective equilibrium. Similarly, if they are interested in forecasting or in
system estimation of the model, then the object of interest is also the timeless perspective
equilibrium. This is certainly not to say that the timeless perspective targeting rule is never
of interest,6 and, to the extent that insight can be gained from both, the techniques described
in this section complement those in the previous section and those described in Giannoni and
Woodford (2002a) and Benigno and Woodford (2007).
For reasons that I explain below, timeless perspective equilibrium can be obtained from
the following three-step procedure.
1. Formulate and solve the period 0 optimal commitment problem.
2. Use the equilibrium relationships to derive expressions for the Lagrange multipliers
(shadow prices).
3. Assume that the expressions derived in step 2 hold in the initial period, thereby intro-
ducing the timeless perspective, and use these expressions to eliminate the shadow prices
from the system.
Notice that this three-step approach obtains the timeless perspective equilibrium directly
from the optimal commitment problem, without requiring modi￿cations to either its objective
function or its constraints (c.f. Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a, and Benigno and Woodford,
2007).
6Indeed, timeless perspective policies are often analyzed for the purpose of establishing policy representations
that can implement uniquely the timeless perspective equilibrium.
6To understand how this three-step procedure works, consider the following general linear-
quadratic control problem. Let the economic environment be one in which an n￿1 vector of
endogenous variables, zt, consisting of n1 predetermined variables, xt, and n2 (n2 = n ￿ n1)
nonpredetermined variables, yt, evolves over time according to
xt+1 = Axxxt + Axyyt + Bxuut + "t+1; (12)
Etyt+1 = Ayxxt + Ayyyt + Byuut; (13)
where ut is a p￿1 vector of policy control variables, "t ￿ i:i:d:[0;￿] is an s￿1 (s ￿ n1) vector
of white-noise innovations, and Et is the private sector￿ s mathematical expectations operator
conditional upon period t information. The matrices Axx, Axy, Ayx, Ayy, Bxu, and Byu
contain the structural parameters that govern preferences and technology and are conformable
with xt, yt, and ut as necessary. The matrix Ayy is assumed to have full rank.
Subject to equations (12) and (13) and x0 known, the control problem is for the policymaker

























. Methods to solve this optimal commitment problem are by now well
known (see Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986)). For the purposes of this
section, however, what is important is that the equilibrium has the form
xt+1 = Mxxxt + Mxppt + "t+1; (15)
pt+1 = Mpxxt + Mpppt; (16)
yt = Hxxt + Hppt; (17)
ut = Fxxt + Fppt; (18)
where pt is the n2￿1 vector of shadow prices associated with the nonpredetermined variables
and the system is initialized with x0 known and p0 = 0. These shadow prices are the direct
analog to the Lagrange multipliers employed earlier, and they serve as state variables, keeping
track of the current value of past promises, in the equilibrium (Kydland and Prescott, 1980).
With the solution to the optimal commitment problem in hand, the second step is to






and rewrite equations (17) and (18) as
dt = Gxxt + Gppt; (19)
7where the construction of Gx and Gp is obvious and straightforward. Importantly, since dt
contains all of the nonpredetermined variables and Ayy has full rank, Gp is a (n2 + p) ￿ n2
matrix with rank(Gp) ￿ n2. Rewriting equation (19) to make pt the subject leads to
pt = G￿1
p (dt ￿ Gxxt); (20)
where G￿1
p represents the generalized (left) inverse of Gp.
In the ￿nal step, I substitute equation (20) into equation (15) and the lag of equation (16),
thereby dispensing with the initial condition p0 = 0. After some reorganization, the timeless










































To understand why this procedure correctly recovers the timeless perspective equilibrium,
consider the relationship between the optimal commitment problem and the timeless perspec-
tive problem. In both problems the policymaker has access to a mechanism that it uses to
commit to its policy. The value of the central bank￿ s policy commitments is encapsulated
in shadow prices. Critically, aside from the initial period, the timeless perspective does not
change either the constraints or the objectives in the optimization problem. As a consequence,
the timeless perspective does not change the system￿ s stability properties, nor does it change
the system￿ s eigenvalues or whether the shadow prices are predetermined, which is why the
optimal commitment policy and the timeless perspective policy share the same asymptotic
equilibrium. What the timeless perspective does change, however, is the system￿ s initial con-
ditions, which is why the optimal commitment policy and the timeless perspective policy have
di⁄erent period-0 transition dynamics and, with discounting, yield di⁄erent losses.
But, although saddle-point solution methods require the partitioning between stable and
unstable eigenvalues to conform to the partitioning between predetermined and nonpredeter-
mined variables (both una⁄ected by the timeless perspective), they do not require an explicit
declaration of the initial conditions. Thus, the timeless perspective equilibrium can be found
by ￿rst applying standard rational expectations control methods. Then, once the equilibrium
has been obtained for arbitrary initial conditions, the timeless perspective can be introduced
by using the equilibrium relationships to make stationary, and subsequently eliminate, the
shadow prices.
Note the role of the rank condition on Gp. This rank condition ensures that the shadow
8prices obtained from equation (20) fully satisfy the model￿ s equilibrium relationships. It
follows that a valid solution for pt can be obtained from any subset of the variables in yt and
ut provided that the resulting Gp matrix has rank(Gp) ￿ n2. Although the particular state
variables that enter the timeless perspective equilibrium will depend on which equilibrium
relationships are used when solving for pt, by construction, they all imply the same welfare
and equilibrium behavior. That timeless perspective equilibria have multiple representations
is also re￿ ected in the fact that although the procedure described above yields an equilibrium
in which ut is a function of xt, xt￿1, yt￿1, and ut￿1, the approach described in Section 2
would yield an equilibrium in which ut is a function of xt, yt￿1, ut￿1, and ut￿2.7
One situation where the rank condition, rank(Gp) ￿ n2, will often fail is when equation
(18) is used in isolation to solve for the shadow prices, as per Tetlow and von zur Muehlen
(2001). They solve for pt according to
pt = F￿1
p (ut ￿ Fxxt); (22)
where F￿1
p denotes the generalized (left) inverse of Fp, and use this expression to eliminate the
shadow prices from the system. The problem with using equation (22) is that, unless p ￿ n2,
the solution for pt will be generated from a system that is underdetermined. Consequently,
the shadow prices will no longer necessarily obey the model￿ s equilibrium relationships. In
the Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) application there was one nonpredetermined variable
and one control variable, so p = n2 and no problem arose. But if p < n2, as is invariably the
case, then employing equation (22) will lead to erroneous results.
Two further points are worth emphasizing before leaving this section. First, provided
dt 6= ut, and therefore that Gp 6= Fp, a representation for the timeless perspective targeting
rule can be recovered by substituting equation (20) back into equation (18). This substitution








which describes a relationship that ut, xt, and yt must satisfy along the equilibrium path.
Second, the timeless perspective equilibrium described by equation (21) essentially has two
components. The ￿rst component is a transition equation for the predetermined variables,
xt+1 = Nxx1xt + Nxx2xt￿1 + Nxddt￿1 + "t+1: (24)
7Importantly, this well-known multiplicity of representations makes no material di⁄erence for the analysis
or conclusions that follow, since I assume￿ for consistency￿ that the conditioning variables satisfy the timeless
perspective equilibrium relationships.
9The second component is a measurement equation for the nonpredetermined variables and the
decision variables
dt = Sdx1xt + Sdx2xt￿1 + Sdddt￿1: (25)
It should be clear from equations (24) and (25) that system estimation of timeless perspec-
tive models involves the very same techniques that are used to estimate rational expectations
models. Thus, the timeless perspective raises no hurdles for estimation other than those al-
ready encountered for rational expectations models (c.f. Juillard and Pelgrin, 2007). Speci￿-
cally, after introducing any necessary measurement error terms, the likelihood function can be
evaluated directly (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Dennis, 2004; Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2007)
or be built up recursively using the Kalman ￿lter (Hansen and Sargent, 1980), depending on
the model, and then either maximized or combined with a prior for Bayesian estimation.
4 Evaluating timeless perspective policies
An obvious alternative to timeless perspective policymaking is for the policymaker to conduct
policy with discretion. Discretion is an obvious alternative because discretionary policies are
rule-based, time-consistent, and, critically, they do not require a commitment mechanism. In
the absence of a commitment mechanism, the discretionary policymaker simply reoptimizes
period by period. Since neither policy is optimal, an essential question is whether timeless
perspective policymaking dominates discretion. This is the question I now address.
However, in order to address this question I need a method for evaluating the performance
of timeless perspective policies, an exercise that is complicated by the presence of the auxiliary
state variables. I begin by considering two possible methods. The ￿rst method is to evaluate
loss conditional on the entire (including the auxiliary) initial state vector; the second method
is to evaluate performance using unconditional loss. Using the simple new Keynesian model
to illustrate, I show that neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory and use their
de￿ciencies to motivate and derive an alternative measure of policy performance.
4.1 The simple example continued
To illustrate the central issues, it is useful to return to the simple model introduced earlier.
Accordingly, I state without proof that the explicit targeting rule associated with discretionary







it = 0: (26)








yt = 0; (28)
respectively. It follows that the state is described by ut for the discretionary policy, by ut
and ￿￿t for the optimal commitment policy, and by ut and yt￿1 for the timeless perspective
policy. As I now illustrate numerically,8 the performances associated with each of these
policies depends importantly on how these di⁄erences among the state variables is treated.
Fig. 1
One way to measure the performance of each policy is to simply evaluate equation (14)
conditional on the relevant initial states. For the optimal commitment policy and the dis-
cretionary policy, it is straightforward to evaluate equation (14), since both policies assume
a given known value for u0 and since for the optimal commitment policy it is known that
￿￿0 = 0. It is slightly more complicated for the timeless perspective policy, since that policy
requires an initial value for y￿1, the lagged output gap.
Consider Figure 1A, which displays performances for u0 = 0 and for an array of di⁄erent
initial values for the lagged output gap. By construction, the optimal commitment policy
8I parameterize the model according to ￿ = 0:025, ￿u = 0:20, ￿ = 0:99, ￿￿u = 1, and ￿ = 0:50.
11generates the best performance, with the optimal commitment policy delivering a 4:3 percent
improvement in performance relative to discretion. Also by construction, since y￿1 is not a
state variable in either the discretionary equilibrium or the optimal commitment equilibrium,
the performances associated with these policies are invariant to this variable.
Now consider the performances associated with the timeless perspective policy. For the
timeless perspective, performance is maximized when y￿1 = 0 and rises symmetrically for
absolute deviations in y￿1 about 0. In fact, when y￿1 = 0, the timeless perspective policy
performs identically to the optimal commitment policy. Most obviously, Figure 1A reveals
that as y￿1 becomes larger in magnitude, loss for the timeless perspective policy increases to
become larger than the loss for discretion. Clearly there exist states (here a lagged output gap
greater than about 0:5 percent) for which discretion is superior, delivering a better performance
than the timeless perspective policy. This is an issue for a central bank pursuing a timeless
perspective policy because in states where discretion is superior it is not clear that the central
bank would continue to implement the inferior policy, highlighting the time inconsistency of the
timeless perspective policy. Timeless perspective policies perform poorly when the output
gap is large because the timeless perspective assumes that it is the stationary asymptotic
equilibrium￿ and not initial expectations or transition dynamics￿ that govern outcomes.
With policies evaluated according to equation (14), it is not di¢ cult to see that it will al-
ways be possible to ￿nd states where discretion is superior to timeless perspective policymaking
for any model in which there is a time-consistency problem.9 An alternative to evaluating
policy according to equation (14), hinted at in the discussion above, is to use unconditional
loss. By using the unconditional expectation of equation (14), the equation￿ s dependence on
the initial state is eliminated. Figure 1B displays unconditional loss for each policy, where
the initial state has been integrated out using the (unconditional) probability density implied
by the model.10 Since policies are now being evaluated according to the characteristics of
their asymptotic equilibrium, and the optimal commitment policy and the timeless perspective
policy share the same asymptotic equilibrium, these policies deliver the same unconditional
loss. Clearly, if unconditional loss is the appropriate measure of performance, then discretion
is the inferior policy.
9To the extent that timeless perspective commitments are untenable in such states, this consideration pro-
vides motivation for the ￿quasi-commitment￿equilibrium analyzed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and
the ￿loose commitment￿equilibrium studied by Debartoli and Nunes (2006).
10Importantly, to the extent that observed data are not well explained by the model, very di⁄erent results
might be obtained if the integration used the observed frequency distribution for the state variables rather than
using the model-implied density function.
12However, while it is common to use unconditional loss when assessing timeless perspective
policy performance (Jensen and McCallum, 2002), there are good reasons for not doing so.
Aside from the most obvious point, which is that the discretionary problem, the optimal
commitment problem, and the timeless perspective problem are all explicitly conditioned on
an observed known initial state, xt, it is well known that ignoring transition dynamics and
evaluating policies according to their asymptotic behavior can lead to spurious welfare reversals
(Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims, 2005).
Although Figure 1A shows that discretion can be superior to timeless perspective policy-
making, neither equation (14) nor its unconditional expectation seems entirely satisfactory for
quantifying timeless perspective policy performance: the former depends on auxiliary state
variables, here y￿1, while the latter ignores initial conditions and transition dynamics. To ad-
dress this issue, in the next section I develop a measure of performance suitable for evaluating
timeless perspective policies.
4.2 Evaluating policy performance
For the general linear-quadratic control problem described by equations (12) through (14), the
three policy approaches examined above have equilibria that can be written in the form
st+1 = Mssst + N"t+1; (29)
yt = Hsst; (30)









. For the discretionary policy qt is the null vector, for the optimal









Now, for arbitrary period t, equations (29) through (31) allow the loss function, conditional














P = c W + ￿M
0
ssPMss; (33)






































where p(st) denotes the density function for st and ￿ represents the unconditional variance
of st. The performances shown in Figure 1A were calculated using (1 ￿ ￿)Lt, while those in
Figure 1B were calculated using (1 ￿ ￿)L.
Rather than integrate with respect to the entire state, st, as equation (35) does, I propose


















where p(qtjxt) denotes the density function for qt conditional on xt. To evaluate this integral,
partition ￿ (and subsequently Mss and P) conformably with xt and qt, then the mean and





and equation (36) is equivalent to
























Equation (39) contains three terms. The ￿rst and third terms represent the penalties
attributable to the known initial state and to the stochastic shocks, respectively. The second
term represents the penalty associated with the conditional variance of the auxiliary states
that are introduced by timeless perspective policymaking. By integrating out the auxiliary
state variables, equation (39) measures average loss for a given state, xt. In the absence of
any auxiliary states, equation (39) is equivalent to equation (32). Further, in the limit as
￿ " 1, equation (39) converges to equation (35).
Before leaving this section, it is worth noting that policy performance, as assessed by equa-
tion (39), is invariant to how the timeless perspective equilibrium is represented, una⁄ected
by the particular choice of dt or by the fact that G￿1
p may not be unique. To understand
why, note that the substantive di⁄erence between the optimal commitment equilibrium and
14the timeless perspective equilibrium is that the shadow prices, pt, are not initialized to 0, but
rather behave in the initial period as they do in all subsequent periods. It follows that there
is actually no need to eliminate the shadow prices from the system (the step that leads to mul-
tiple representations) when evaluating equation (39). Instead, one can simply integrate with
respect to the shadow prices conditional on xt. Because the optimal commitment policy has
a unique representation in terms of xt and pt (under standard and quite general conditions),
so too does the timeless perspective equilibrium, and this unique representation yields unique
values for the mean and variance of pt conditional on xt.11
4.3 The simple example again
Returning to the simple model, I now evaluate performance using (1 ￿ ￿)b Lt while varying
￿, the slope of the Phillips curve, and ￿, the weight on gap stabilization.12 Figure 2A
displays the performances for the optimal commitment policy, the timeless perspective policy,
and the time-consistent policy as ￿ is varied between (0;0:1], holding ￿u and ￿ constant at
their benchmark values. Complementing Figure 2A, Figure 2C displays the performances
associated with varying ￿ between (0;10] while holding ￿u and ￿ constant at their benchmark
values. In contrast, Figures 2B and 2D are generated allowing both ￿ and ￿ to vary between
(0;0:1] and (0;10], respectively, displaying as a percent the fraction of occasions for which the
discretionary policy performs better than the timeless perspective policy against particular
values of ￿ and ￿, respectively.
11Without wishing to labor the point, this invariance property is also a feature of unconditional loss, and for
the same reason. Unconditional loss is invariant to the multiplicity of representations because it integrates out
the entire state vector, which includes the auxillary states.
12Consistent with Figure 1, I set ￿ = 0:025, ￿ = 0:50, ￿u = 0:20, and ￿￿u = 1, and the initial state is given
by u0 = 0.
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Figure 2A reveals that, ceteris paribus, discretion does better than timeless perspective
policymaking when ￿ is small and the Phillips curve is relatively ￿ at. Low values for ￿ can
arise when prices adjust infrequently and/or when strategic complementarities are important.
When the Phillips curve is relatively ￿ at, monetary policy must generate large movements in
the output gap to stabilize in￿ ation, and, relative to discretion, these large movements in the
output gap undermine the performance of the timeless perspective policy. Similarly, ceteris
paribus, Figure 2C shows that discretion does better than timeless perspective policymaking
when ￿ is large. Complementing these ￿ndings, Figure 2B shows that, while the share of
the parameter space for which discretion dominates the timeless perspective is decreasing in
￿, there appears to be a threshold value for ￿ above which timeless perspective policymaking
always dominates. Figure 2D reveals that the share of the parameter space for which dis-
16cretion dominates timeless perspective policymaking increases monotonically with the weight
on output gap stabilization. The main conclusions to take away from Figure 2 are that,
although the improvement in loss may be small, discretion is more likely to perform better
than timeless perspective policymaking when the Phillips curve is relatively ￿ at and when the
weight on output gap stabilization is relatively large.
5 A small-scale DSGE model
In the previous section, I analyzed a simple New Keynesian model and found that discretion
could be superior to timeless perspective policymaking. In this section, I undertake a broader
analysis using a more sophisticated business cycle model that contains a wider array of shocks
and propagation mechanisms. Importantly, the model contains margins for substitution and
mechanisms for propagating shocks that are present in most modern New Keynesian business
cycle models. As with the simple model, I ￿nd that discretion can be superior to timeless
perspective policymaking. Next, I extend this DSGE model to include features, such as
￿rm-speci￿c labor markets and Kimball (1995) aggregation, that are increasingly employed in
DSGE models. I show that these modeling features and others like them raise the likelihood
that discretion will dominate timeless perspective policymaking.
5.1 The model
Let the economy be populated by households, intermediate-good producing ￿rms, ￿nal-good
producing ￿rms, and a central bank. Households are identical and in￿nitely lived, choosing

















where f￿;￿g 2 (0;1) represent the (inverse) elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the
Frisch labor supply elasticity, respectively, subject to the budget constraint
ct + it +
bt+1
Pt




and the accumulation equation
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it; (42)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the depreciation rate. In equations (41) and (42), wt denotes
the consumption real wage, Rt denotes the real rental rate of capital, kt, Pt denotes the price
17of the ￿nal good, rt denotes the net real return on the one-period nominal bond, bt, and Dt
denotes (in units of the ￿nal good) the lump-sum dividend that households receive from the
intermediate-good producing ￿rms.
On the production side, a unit-continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate-
good producing ￿rms rent capital and hire labor in perfectly competitive markets. Indexing
￿rms by ￿ 2 [0;1], the ￿￿ th ￿rm chooses lt (￿), kt (￿), and its price, pt (￿), to maximize its
value, subject to three things: the production technology
yt (￿) = eutkt (￿)
￿ lt (￿)
1￿￿ ; (43)







where Yt denotes aggregate output and "t 2 (1;1) represents the (stochastic) elasticity of
substitution between goods; and a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. In the Calvo (1983) model,
randomly chosen ￿rms of share 1 ￿ ￿ are able to make capital, labor, and pricing decisions
while the remaining share are only able to make capital and labor decisions. All ￿rms make
their capital and labor decisions to minimize the real cost of producing a marginal unit of













where ￿t denotes the marginal utility of consumption, while the remaining ￿rms keep their
prices unchanged. Pro￿ts are aggregated and returned to households (shareholders) in the
form of a lump-sum dividend.
The ￿nal-good producing ￿rms also seek to maximize pro￿ts. They purchase intermediate














and sell these ￿nal goods to households in a perfectly competitive market. As is well known,














18The model contains three stochastic elements: these translate into an aggregate markup





, an aggregate consumption-preference shock, gt, and an aggregate tech-
nology shock, ut. These three shocks evolve over time according to
b vt+1 = ￿b vb vt + ￿b vt+1; (48)
gt+1 = ￿ggt + ￿gt+1; (49)
ut+1 = ￿uut + ￿ut+1; (50)









are i:i:d: with zero mean and ￿nite variance.
5.1.1 The log-linear model
When log-linearized about a zero-in￿ ation nonstochastic steady state, the constraints and
￿rst-order conditions for this model are
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
c mct + b vt; (51)
c mct = ￿b Rt + (1 ￿ ￿) b wt ￿ ut; (52)
b lt = b Rt ￿ b wt + b kt; (53)
b wt = ￿b lt + ￿b ct ￿ gt; (54)
Et b Rt+1 =
1 + ￿
￿ + ￿
(rt+1 ￿ Et￿t+1); (55)
b ct = Etb ct+1 ￿
1
￿
(rt+1 ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ gt + Etgt+1); (56)
b kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿b it; (57)
b yt = (1 ￿ ￿)b ct + ￿b it; (58)
b yt = ut + ￿b kt + (1 ￿ ￿)b lt; (59)
where ￿ ￿
1￿￿
￿ is the discount rate, ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿+￿
"￿1
" is the steady-state share of investment in
output, and " > 1 is the steady-state elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Equation (51) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve linking in￿ ation to movements in real
marginal costs. Equation (52) documents the relationship between real marginal costs and
the costs of the production factors, capital and labor. Equations (53) and (54) describe
labor demand and supply, respectively. Equation (55) summarizes the connection between
the rental rate of capital and the return on the one-period nominal bond that arises from the
household￿ s portfolio decision. Equation (56) is the standard consumption-Euler equation
19for time-separable isoelastic preferences. Equations (57) through (59) represent to ￿rst-
order accuracy the capital accumulation equation, the resource constraint, and the aggregate
production technology.
Turning now to monetary policy, I assume, for simplicity, that the central bank￿ s decision
problem is to choose frt+1g
1










subject to equations (48) through (59) and the known initial conditions b v0, g0, u0, and k0.
5.1.2 Results
As earlier, I now analyze policy performance on a parameter grid. Speci￿cally, I condition on
the depreciation rate and on the parameters in the shock processes,13 since preliminary inves-
tigations indicated these ￿persistence￿parameters were largely unimportant for the results,
and analyze the performance of discretion relative to timeless perspective policymaking on a
grid of values for ￿, ￿, ￿, ", ￿, and ￿. The results are shown in Figure 3, which displays, for
each parameter, the share of the parameter space for which discretion is the superior policy.14
13For this exercise, I set ￿g = ￿v = 0:3, ￿u = 0:95, and ￿ = 0:025. Further, the initial state is described by
b v0 = g0 = u0 = k0 = 0, such that the economy initially resides at its nonstochastic steady state.
14Blake and Kirsanova (2008) have shown recently that this model can exhibit multiple discretionary equi-
libria. In my simulations, I addressed this possibility by using multiple starting points to search for the
worst-performing discretionary equilibrium.
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Figure 3 reveals that the performance of discretion relative to timeless perspective policy-
making declines as ￿ and ￿ increase and increases as ￿, ", ￿, and ￿ increase. Since higher
values of ￿ imply a ￿ atter Phillips curve, the results in Figure 3B are consistent with those in
Figure 2A. With respect to ￿, ￿, ", and ￿, whether changes in these parameters help or hin-
der discretion turns primarily on how they alter the trade-o⁄ the central bank faces between
stabilizing in￿ ation and stabilizing the gap, with factors that worsen the trade-o⁄ helping
discretion. Thus, the relative performance of discretion improves for higher values of ￿ and ￿
and for lower values of ￿. With respect to ", higher values of " help discretion because they
lower the steady-state consumption share of output, weakening the policy channel operating
on real marginal costs through consumption and wages. The e⁄ects of changes in ￿ are more
complicated. Higher values for ￿ help discretion because they lower the steady-state share
of consumption in output and because they weaken the policy channel operating on real mar-
ginal costs through consumption and wages. However, higher values of ￿ also strengthen the
policy channel operating on real marginal costs through the real rental rate, and, since interest
rates have a large e⁄ect on the rental rate of capital, this e⁄ect tends to dominate. Figure 3
further reveals that the parameter space for which discretion dominates timeless perspective
21policymaking is relatively small, and the reason for this is clear. In this model, only when the
Calvo parameter is large, with ￿ greater than about 0:90, can discretion be superior. Thus,
analogous to the simple model analyzed in Section 4, there appears to be a threshold value
for ￿ below which discretion cannot be superior.
5.2 Adding ￿rm-speci￿c labor and Kimball aggregation
I now make two modi￿cations to the DSGE model. First, following Woodford (2003, 2005),
I introduce ￿rm-speci￿c labor and dispense with the assumption that there is a single aggre-
gate market in which to hire labor. When labor is ￿rm-speci￿c, a ￿rm making its pricing
decision will take into account the e⁄ect its price has on its real marginal costs, which are
no longer independent of the pricing decision or identical across ￿rms. Second, drawing on
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) and Woodford (2005), to whom interested readers are referred,
I introduce the Kimball (1995) aggregator in place of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
in the production of the ￿nal good. Although some variables, such as b wt and c mct require
new interpretation, in terms of the aggregate log-linear relationships, these two modi￿cations
manifest themselves in the in￿ ation Phillips curve, which is now given by
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿












and where ! 2 [0;1) is the Kimball
curvature parameter, the price elasticity of ". When ! = 0, the Kimball (1995) aggregator is
equivalent to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1997) aggregator.15
Since f￿l;￿kg 2 (0;1), it is clear that the e⁄ect of these modi￿cations is to lower the
coe¢ cient on real marginal costs in the Phillips curve, thereby reducing its slope for any given
value of ￿. Of course, it is the very fact that mechanisms like Kimball aggregation and ￿rm-
speci￿c labor markets ￿ atten the Phillips curve that underlies their rising popularity in the
New Keynesian DSGE literature. These mechanisms can rationalize with reasonable estimates
of nominal price rigidity the small coe¢ cient on real marginal costs found in estimated Phillips
curves.
15Although I introduce both ￿rm-speci￿c labor and Kimball aggregation, since both appear to be plausi-
ble, I recognize, indeed exploit, the fact that they have equivalent e⁄ects on the slope of the Phillips curve
(Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007; Levin, Lopez-Salido, and Yun, 2007).
225.2.1 Results
To analyze this modi￿ed DSGE model I again condition on the depreciation rate and the
parameters in the shock processes and evaluate loss on a grid for the other parameters. Figure
4 displays the percent of the parameter space for which discretion is superior to timeless
perspective policymaking, for given values of ￿, ￿, ￿, ", ￿, !, and ￿.
Fig. 4
Qualitatively, the results in Figure 4 are in keeping with those in Figure 3. Discretion is
superior to timeless perspective policymaking for a larger share of the parameter space when
￿ and ￿ are small or when ￿, ￿, and ￿ are large. In addition, since higher values for !, the
23Kimball curvature parameter, serve to ￿ atten the Phillips curve, discretion is more likely to
dominate timeless perspective policymaking when ! is large. Unlike in Figure 3, however,
the frequencies with which discretion dominates the timeless perspective are much larger at
all points of the parameter space and the ability for discretion to be better than the timeless
perspective occurs at much lower values of ￿, i.e., at much smaller levels of nominal price
rigidity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that discretion can be superior to timeless perspective policymaking
and I have identi￿ed factors that contribute to this. Broadly speaking, discretion is more likely
to be superior to timeless perspective policymaking when the Phillips curve is relatively ￿ at,
i.e., in models where nominal price rigidity is important or where factors such as Kimball
aggregation or ￿rm-speci￿c labor/capital are present. These ￿ndings are important because
these very factors are becoming widely employed in the New Keynesian DSGE models used
to analyze monetary policy. Although a timeless perspective approach to policymaking may
have its attractions, one should not simply assume that timeless perspective policymaking is
superior to discretion.
One di¢ culty with comparing discretion to timeless perspective policymaking has been
￿nding a suitable metric for assessing performance. This di¢ culty arises because the time-
less perspective introduces auxiliary state variables that are absent from the time-consistent
equilibrium. Rather than simply assigning initial values to these auxiliary state variables or
using unconditional loss to evaluate policies, I propose evaluating policies using a measure of
conditional loss that integrates out the auxiliary state variables conditional upon the known
predetermined state variables. The measure of performance that I develop is easy to com-
pute, provides a consistent treatment of the initial conditions in the discretion and the timeless
perspective equilibria, and is consistent with the conditioning assumptions that describe the
associated optimization problems.
The goal of this paper has not been to criticize the timeless perspective as an approach to
policy design. Rather, because timeless perspective policies are suboptimal, the goal has been
to highlight that timeless perspective policies are not necessarily superior to other suboptimal
policies, of which discretion is a leading example. It is certainly unclear why a central bank
should commit to implementing a timeless perspective policy when that policy is inferior to a
time consistent alternative. The results in this paper suggest that studies analyzing timeless
24perspective policies might usefully consider their performance alongside that of discretion,
evaluating the policies using the measure of conditional loss developed in this paper.
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